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 How much “voice” should shareholders have in a large modern corporation? 
Shareholders who disagree with the course of events at their corporations have two main 
mechanisms to express their dissent: they can threaten to sell their shares, that is, “exit,” or 
alternatively, they can engage with management and express their opinions, that is, use the 
“voice” mechanism (Hirschman1970). While the impact of exit on firm value and policies has 
been studied extensively, less attention has been devoted to estimating the value of voice in 
corporations. Hirschman (1970) first introduced the idea that voice was an important mechanism 
for the correct operation of institutions (from firms to public schools); yet, to date, there is little 
systematic evidence on the actual impact of voice as a disciplining mechanism within firms. 
 This paper studies the consequences of Say on Pay, a mechanism that allows shareholders 
to express their voice by voting on a crucial corporate matter: the pay policy of its executive 
officers and its relationship to firm performance. Firms with a Say on Pay policy in place offer 
shareholders a regular advisory vote on whether they approve of the relationship between 
executive pay and performance in their companies. Given that the focus of this vote is not just on 
pay itself but on whether pay is commensurate with the value that the CEO adds to the firm, the 
vote resembles an explicit confidence vote on the CEO: the vote effectively aggregates the 
opinion of shareholders into a simple and highly visible metric. 
 Our goal is to provide a causal estimate of the effect of increasing shareholder voice on 
shareholder value, firm performance, and executive pay. To do so, we use a regression 
discontinuity design on the vote outcomes of shareholder-sponsored Say on Pay proposals at 
annual meetings between 2006 and 2010. This provides direct evidence on the consequences of 
giving shareholders more voice in the affairs of their companies through Say on Pay. 
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 Proponents of Say on Pay argue that it strengthens shareholder oversight and can limit 
executive compensation excesses; critics contend that it does not effectively monitor 
compensation, and consider it to be a costly, intrusive policy that undermines the power of the 
board. This view is reflected in the fact that management is systematically opposed to the 
policy.1 The interest in Say on Pay culminated with its inclusion in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which made Say on Pay compulsory at all U.S. 
firms starting in 2011. This has been a highly contentious policy that continues to be a source of 
debate. Still, our current knowledge on the effects of the policy is limited, and the debate has 
been hampered by the lack of causal evidence on its consequences.2 
 Adopting a Say on Pay policy is correlated with multiple firm attributes and hence is 
highly endogenous. Given this endogeneity problem, to evaluate the consequences of Say on 
Pay, ideally one would like to randomly allocate this policy measure to different firms and 
examine their subsequent stock market reaction, performance, and pay policy changes. However, 
this is an impossible experiment de facto. Furthermore, investors in the stock market incorporate 
expectations as they receive information on the value of adopting a Say on Pay proposal. Thus, it 
is difficult to capture the effect of the policies using changes in market prices in the absence of 
clear events where unexpected information is released. We argue that Say on Pay shareholder 
proposals voted in annual meetings provide us with this quasi-experimental setting. 
 Between 2006 and 2010, shareholders in a number of S&P 1500 firms proposed to adopt 
Say on Pay and held a vote to adopt the policy in 258 occasions.3 Our approach is to use a 
regression discontinuity design that compares the stock market reaction and other outcomes of 
Say on Pay proposals that pass by a small margin to those that fail by a small margin (similar to 
Mas and Lee [2012] or, in an event-study setting, to Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe [2012]). The 
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intuition behind this strategy is that the average characteristics of a firm in which a Say on Pay 
proposal passes with 50.1 percent of the votes are similar to those of a firm in which the proposal 
gathers only 49.9 percent and fails to pass. However, this small difference in the vote share leads 
to a discrete change in the probability of implementing these proposals. In other words, for close-
call proposals, passing is akin to an independent random event that is correlated with the 
implementation of the proposal, but it is “locally” exogenous and therefore uncorrelated with 
other firm characteristics. We show that for votes around the majority threshold, passing is 
uncorrelated with observed firm and meeting characteristics. Moreover, when studying the stock 
market reaction, it is precisely for these close-call proposals that the vote contains substantial 
information—switching from an unpredictable outcome to either pass or fail—that is not already 
fully incorporated in prices. Therefore, the regression discontinuity design delivers a causal 
estimate of the expected value of adopting Say on Pay. 
 We find that Say on Pay significantly increases shareholders’ value. On the day of the 
vote, a Say on Pay proposal that passes yields an abnormal return of 2.7 percent relative to one 
that fails. Given that the shareholder vote outcome is not binding, the market reaction should 
only account for the increase in the probability with which the proposal will be implemented 
after a positive shareholder vote. We collected information on whether each proposal in our 
sample was implemented and found that there is a 50 percent higher probability of 
implementation for proposals that narrowly pass at the vote threshold. This implies that 
implementing Say on Pay will deliver an increase in shareholder value of about 5.4 percent. 
 Where do these large market gains come from? In principle, there are two distinct 
channels through which a Say on Pay policy can improve firm performance. First, by giving a 
clear mechanism for shareholders to express their voice, monitoring and pressure on boards and 
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CEOs increases, potentially leading to an increase in performance. Second, the policy can affect 
the level and structure of pay such that there is a better alignment of pay to performance. 
 Our results show that Say on Pay has a strong positive impact on firm accounting and 
operational performance in the years following the vote, beyond the short-term market reaction: 
firms that pass Say on Pay proposals have higher growth in earnings per share, return on assets, 
return on equity, and Tobin’s Q one year after the vote. We also find that these companies have a 
higher increase in labor productivity (sales per worker) one year and two years after the vote. 
Some of the increase in labor productivity is associated with a decline in the number of 
employees, but only one year after the vote. These results provide strong evidence of efficiency 
and profitability gains achieved through the implementation of the Say on Pay proposals. 
 The effects on compensation are smaller. While we do find that following a positive Say 
on Pay vote, firms have lower salary growth and a small increase in the sensitivity of pay to 
performance, we do not find large systematic changes in the level or structure of CEO 
compensation. We find no evidence that CEOs are more likely to leave the firm after a positive 
vote. Given that performance at the Say on Pay firms is improving, arguably resulting from 
higher effort from management, it is not surprising that there are no dramatic changes in pay: to 
the extent that pay is linked to performance, and performance increases, pay can remain 
unchanged even if shareholders are stricter on pay awards given a level of performance. Overall, 
while Say on Pay may tie compensation more closely to performance, our results rule out that it 
leads to a large and across the board reduction in the level of executive compensation. 
 Our results suggest that Say on Pay operates as a mechanism to monitor and incentivize 
CEOs to deliver better firm performance, as it creates a clear mechanism for shareholders to 
express their voice. This leads to large improvements in shareholder value and firm performance 
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for firms in our sample.4 We interpret these results, together with the strong opposition of 
executives to adopting these policies, as indicating that current governance structure may give 
insufficient voice to shareholders in large corporations. 
 These results are therefore important to determine the appropriate role of government 
regulation and shareholder activism in shaping corporate governance structures. Say on Pay has 
been made compulsory in countries such as the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK. In the United 
States, the controversy around Say on Pay continues: after the 2010 Dodd-Frank Financial 
Regulation Act made the policy compulsory at all firms starting in 2011, the 2012 Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act eliminated that requirement for firms with gross annual revenues of less 
than $1 billion. This paper provides causal evidence on the effect of Say on Pay for the early 
U.S. adopters. We show that Say on Pay specifically, but also more broadly giving shareholders 
more voice, can have substantial effects. This is a relevant result to guide the debate. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 Say on Pay policies are the result of a general trend toward requiring more accountability 
from CEOs, improved transparency, and increased shareholders rights. They emerge following 
an increase in the number of shareholder proposals submitted to a vote at annual meetings that 
focus on compensation-related matters. These proposals typically express shareholder discontent 
with executive pay policies and are aimed at reinforcing the pay for performance link, 
eliminating or reducing “exit packages,” or improving disclosure (see Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu 
[2011] for an analysis of shareholders activism and pay). 
 Starting in 2006, shareholders of several companies proposed to adopt a Say on Pay 
policy in their firms. Between 2006 and 2010, 258 shareholder proposals were filed with the 
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SEC and voted to adopt an advisory vote. A firm that adopts a Say on Pay policy commits to 
offer a regular vote to its shareholders on whether they approve of the relationship between 
executive pay and firm performance. Companies such as Motorola, Target, Raytheon, or Pfizer 
were all targets of Say on Pay proposals in that period. A noteworthy case is the Verizon 
proposal in 2007, which was approved by a very narrow margin (50.18 percent) and 
implemented in 2009. Shareholders gave the following rationale for proposing to adopt Say on 
Pay at Verizon: “We believe that the current rules governing senior executive compensation do 
not give shareholders sufficient influence over pay practices—nor do they give the Board 
adequate feedback from the owners of the company.” This suggests that greater voice, in the 
form of increased “feedback” and “influence,” was an important goal. The proposal also states 
that Say on Pay would “. . . encourage shareholders to scrutinize the new, more extensive 
disclosures required by the SEC,” suggesting that the incentives for shareholders to monitor 
increase when they have better tools to take action (a recurrent argument in Hirschman [1970]). 
 The increasing focus on Say on Pay in the United States culminated with its incorporation 
in the Dodd-Frank Act of July 2010. The law changes several aspects of the governance and 
disclosure practices of all public companies. Among these changes, it provides shareholders the 
right to a regular advisory vote on a company’s current and future executive compensation and is 
mandatory for all U.S.-listed firms starting in 2011.5 Proponents of the bill have argued that Say 
on Pay strengthens the relationship between the board of directors, executives, and shareholders, 
ensuring that board members fulfill their fiduciary duty. Critics argue that Say on Pay does not 
effectively monitor compensation, and consider it to be an intrusive policy that undermines the 
power of the board. 
7 
 
 The proposal of Say on Pay policies prior to the resolution of the bill by the Senate in 
July 2010 (between 2006 and early 2010),\ received substantial support by shareholders: on 
average, shareholders voted 43 percent in favor of adopting Say on Pay proposals (Table 1), 
which is large relative to the average vote on corporate governance shareholder proposals (36 
percent) or, in particular, relative to all other compensation proposals (23 percent). We now turn 
to the expected effects of the policy. 
 Given that Say on Pay is not binding, it has been argued that it should have no effect on 
executive and director behaviors, and hence on firm outcomes. However, given that there are 
potential costs associated with the vote (e.g., legal costs, costs of managing the relationship with 
investors), the net effect of putting in place the Say on Pay mechanism may very well be 
negative even if it has no effect on behavior. Say on Pay can also be detrimental to firm 
performance for other reasons: To the extent that the board of directors is better informed on the 
affairs of the company than the average shareholder, they should be better placed to make the 
right decisions for the firm; directors (and CEOs) may also have private information that it is in 
the interest of shareholders that it is not divulged to the market. In those circumstances, 
restricting directors’ actions can be value reducing for shareholders. 
 There are also a number of channels through which Say on Pay proposals can positively 
affect firm performance. A direct channel, often echoed by popular views, is that these policies 
can help curb excessive pay. Indeed, Say on Pay policies may reduce the share of firm surplus 
that CEOs are able to capture; however, the potential gains from this effect are modest from the 
point of view of shareholder value. Given the size of CEO and executive pay relative to total 
firm value, even a substantial reduction in total pay would represent a small change in 
shareholder value. A slightly different channel operates through better alignment of pay with 
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performance: any improved incentives resulting from Say on Pay would make CEOs more 
effective at generating higher profits. 
 A Say on Pay policy is also an automatic mechanism that allows shareholders to express 
dissent. If the policy is adopted, Say on Pay votes are held regularly and are part of the set of 
votes that shareholders emit in annual meetings (along with director elections and other 
governance votes, for example). But Say on Pay is the only vote that allows shareholders to 
express a clear opinion on the relationship between pay and performance and as such is akin to a 
referendum on CEO performance, a vote of confidence on the CEO. This mechanism for 
increased shareholder voice empowers shareholders, who have a mechanism through which they 
can punish a CEO for poor performance. Even though the Say on Pay votes themselves are only 
advisory by nature, they are very visible, they aggregate shareholder opinion into a simple 
metric, and they can also serve as a coordination mechanism for further votes to remove 
management or board members. This is why they are potentially an effective “voice” 
mechanism. 
 The Say on Pay process also requires boards to disclose more information about CEO 
pay, and in particular about the rationale behind the chosen compensation package, including its 
relationship to past and planned performance. To the extent that shareholders have more 
information and a better way to discipline managers, their monitoring is more effective, and 
hence the incentives to monitor are higher. 
 The existing empirical literature on Say on Pay in the United States provides mixed 
results. Cai and Walkling (2011), using an event study methodology, find that the Say on Pay bill 
that passed in the House of Representatives in April 2010 created value for firms with inefficient 
executive compensation and with weak governance. However, they find a negative price effect 
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when examining the price reaction upon announcement of a shareholder Say on Pay proposal 
between 2006 and 2008, and a positive effect when the proposal is defeated. For the UK, Ferri 
and Maber (2013) examine the implementation of Say on Pay regulation in 2002 in the UK and 
find, also in an event study setting, a positive market reaction to the regulation in firms with 
weak penalties from poor performance. 
 One possible reason for these mixed findings is that with standard event study 
methodologies, the event date can be confounded by different news and information being 
released to the market on the same date. As we discuss below, our estimation strategy (the 
regression discontinuity design) actually estimates a causal effect and deals with this problem. 
 Finally, Balachandran, Ferri and Maber (2008) examine the effect of the UK Say on Pay 
regulation on pay ex post and find some evidence that it increased the sensitivity of CEO pay to 
poor accounting performance (but not to stock performance); that is, it curbed the “pay for 
failure” scenario. To date, however, there is no evidence on the impact of Say on Pay on the 
detailed components of pay for the United States, or more importantly, on long-term firm 
performance. 
 
DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
Data description 
 We obtain data on Say on Pay proposals from RiskMetrics. The data set includes 
information on all the proposals voted in the S&P 1500 universe plus an additional 500 widely 
held firms. There were 258 shareholder-sponsored proposals voted at annual meetings from 2006 
until 2010 to implement Say on Pay provisions. RiskMetrics provides information on the 
company name, the date of the annual meeting, and the percentage of votes in favor of the 
proposal. Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of proposals by year and some vote statistics. 
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The number of voted proposals increased throughout the period as well as the proportion of votes 
in favor. As a result, the percentage of passed proposals increased from 15 percent in 2007 to 25 
percent in 2010. Our identification strategy relies on proposals with a close-call vote outcome. 
More than half of the voted proposals in our sample fall within 10 percentage points of the 
majority threshold and provide power to our identification. 
 Any shareholder that owns at least 1 percent or $2,000 of the securities for at least one 
year is entitled to vote and can submit a proposal to implement a Say on Pay provision. The 
proponents of Say on Pay proposals are diverse and are classified in Panel B of Table 1. The 
most frequent sponsors are unions, followed by individuals and socially responsible funds. 
 We use additional information from a number of different sources: security prices from 
CRSP are used to calculate daily abnormal returns with a standard OLS model, and also with the 
three Fama-French factors plus a momentum factor (Carhart [1997]).6 Financial information 
comes from Compustat and executive compensation from Execucomp. 
 
Identification strategy 
 We are interested in the impact of passing a Say on Pay proposal on an outcome variable 
yf t such as the stock market reaction or subsequent performance and pay policies. We can define 
vft as the votes in favor of a Say on Pay proposal for firm f at time t, v* as the majority threshold 
for a proposal to pass and an indicator for pass as Dft = 1(vft ≥ v*), so we can write 
 yf t = Κ + Dftθ + uf t. (1) 
 The effect of interest is captured by the coefficient θ, while uft represents all other 
determinants of the outcome (E[uft] = 0). However, this regression cannot be estimated directly 
given that passing a proposal is likely to be correlated with omitted variables that are themselves 
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correlated with yft. The estimated θ̂  will be biased given that E(Dft, uft) ≠ 0. Moreover, it would 
be difficult to interpret the causality of the results given that some outcome variables (e.g., future 
expected pay structure) may affect shareholder votes and lead to reverse causality. 
 To obtain a causal estimate of the effect of Say on Pay proposals we use a regression 
discontinuity estimate that exploits that, in an arbitrarily small interval around the discontinuity 
(the threshold v*), whether the proposal passed or failed, is akin to a random outcome. Cuñat, 
Gine, and Guadalupe (2010) show the conditions under which one can recover the value of 
implementing a proposal in an event-study setting using a regression discontinuity design. 
 More formally, Lee (2008) shows that as long as there is a (possibly small) random 
component to the vote, the assignment into “treatment” (pass and Dft = 1) and “control” groups 
(fails and Dft = 0) is random around the threshold. A simple nonparametric way to estimate θ̂  is 
therefore to measure the difference in average yft between Say on Pay proposals that either pass 
or do not by a narrow margin of votes. This is an unbiased estimate of θ that can be interpreted 
as causal. However a more efficient way to estimate the effect consists of fitting a flexible 
function that captures the continuous relationship between yf t and v, allowing for a discontinuous 
jump at the discontinuity v*. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we approximate the underlying 
relationship between yft and vf , with two different polynomials for observations on the right-hand 
side of the threshold Pr(vft, γr) and on the left-hand side of the threshold Pl(vft, γl), and we also 
include year dummies ατ : 
 yf t  = Dft θ + Pr(vf t, γ
r)  + Pl(vf t; γ
l )  + ατ + uf t. (2)  
 The polynomials Pr(vft, γr) and Pl(vft; γl) capture any continuous relationship between yft 
and vft, and in particular, the effect of any confounding factors that are correlated both with the 
vote and firm characteristics in a continuous way. At the same time, θ captures the discrete 
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changes in yft at the majority threshold, and it is a consistent estimate of the causal effect of the 
passing of a proposal on yft. This procedure is a more efficient way to estimate the effect than a 
simple comparison of means around the threshold, as all the observations participate in the 
estimation. The estimate of θ captures the weighted average effect across all firms, where more 
weight is given to those firms in which a close election was expected. The order of the 
polynomial has to be chosen to balance having a function that is flexible enough to capture the 
effect of any omitted variables that are continuous at the threshold and the loss of degrees of 
freedom. We choose a polynomial of order four to each side of the discontinuity and after 
checking that the results are robust to using polynomials of order three and five. 
 
Sample characteristics and preexisting differences 
 In this section we investigate two selection issues that are important to understand the 
scope and external validity of our results (i.e., whether one could plausibly expect that our results 
would also apply to firms outside our sample). The first one is to assess whether the firms in our 
sample are representative of a broader population of firms. To do so we compare firms with a 
Say on Pay proposal in our sample to the general population of S&P 1500 firms. The second 
issue relates to the selection into treated and nontreated firms within our sample. To the extent 
that the exact vote outcome around the threshold is random, our identification strategy implies 
that there is no selection into treatment; that is, firms that pass a Say on Pay provision by few 
votes should be ex ante comparable to firms that reject a Say on Pay provision by a short margin. 
We run a number of tests to evaluate the validity of this assumption. 
 We start by assessing what types of firms constitute our sample. From the RiskMetrics 
sampling universe (S&P 1500 plus 500 additional firms that are widely held), only a subset of 
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firms is targeted with votes on Say on Pay, and 64 percent of those have votes within 10 percent 
of the threshold. To assess how different the average S&P 1500 firm is from the firms 
identifying our estimate, we explore the determinants that make firms more prone to having a 
contested Say on Pay vote. Table 2 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics for firms 
in our sample, as well as for the universe of S&P 1500 firms in our sample period. The one 
systematic difference between them appears to be firm size. Firms are different in terms of total 
market value, number of employees, total CEO pay, and the extent of dispersed ownership, as is 
expected in larger firms. However, based on ratios (that control for size), there do not seem to be 
systematic differences in terms of profitability (this is also shown in Cai and Walkling [2011]). 
Furthermore, once one controls for firm size in total CEO pay (variable labeled abnormal pay in 
Table 2), we do not find that CEOs of targeted firms earn more.7 In fact, we find that targeted 
firms are typically larger and have less institutional ownership than nontargeted firms. Although 
these differences do not generate biases to our estimate of the treatment on the treated, they have 
to be taken into account when generalizing the results to a broader population of firms. 
 From the bottom panel of Table 3 one can also infer the typical structure of votes in our 
sample. Institutional investors have, on average, 70 percent of the votes, although these are quite 
dispersed among them. There are two shareholders with holdings above 5 percent, and the top 
five investors accumulate, on average, 21 percent of the votes.8 There are  a substantial amount 
of votes held by dispersed shareholders, which reduces the ex ante predictability of the vote. 
 Table 3 examines whether there are any of the preexisting differences between firms that 
pass a Say on Pay proposal and firms that don’t. Columns 1 and 3 compare the characteristics of 
the whole population of firms, while columns 2 and 4 report only the effect at the discontinuity 
by including polynomials of order four on either side of the threshold. Columns 1 and 2 refer to 
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the variables in levels and columns 3 and 4 in growth rates. Column 1 shows that, on average, 
firms that pass a proposal have different characteristics than firms that fail a proposal. For 
instance, firms that pass a proposal have, on average, lower prior return on assets and lower 
earnings per share than firms that  fail a proposal. These are the kinds of selection problems that 
would make the estimates of regression (1) biased. In contrast, when we control for a polynomial 
in the vote share and estimate the effect at the discontinuity (in columns 2 and 4), we find that 
these average differences across firms on each side of the threshold disappear. Hence, we do not 
find any systematic differences between firms on each side of the majority threshold. 
 Next, we concentrate on the distribution of shareholder votes. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of votes within the sample. First, the average and median vote is slightly below the 
majority threshold, but 64 percent of the observations fall within 10 percentage points from the 
majority threshold. This implies that our regression discontinuity coefficient is estimated from a 
large and significant share of the actual votes and hence can be thought of as representative of 
the effect of Say on Pay on the average firm in our sample. Second, Figure1 shows that the 
distribution of votes is also continuous at the 50 percent threshold.9 The fact that there is no 
sharp discontinuity in the distribution of votes at the threshold indicates that there is no strategic 
voting or withdrawal of proposals for close-call votes. Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) show 
a similar lack of strategic voting for all shareholder-sponsored proposals, whereas Listokin 
(2008) documents that strategic withdrawal of proposals is a real issue for management-
sponsored proposals. 
 Overall, this section shows that the assumptions behind our identification strategy—
continuity of votes at the majority threshold and lack of preexisting differences in the 
neighborhood of pass—do hold and allow us to estimate a clean causal effect. It also shows that 
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the main distinguishing difference between firms in our sample and the sampling universe is firm 
size rather than profitability, which may be the result of large firms being more visible. 
 
 RESULTS 
The effect of Say on Pay on abnormal returns 
 To evaluate the impact of Say on Pay proposals on shareholder value, we first examine 
the market reaction to passing a Say on Pay proposal. Table 4 shows estimates of the difference 
in abnormal returns between  proposals that pass and those that do not. We compute this 
difference for increasingly close intervals around the majority threshold, to isolate the causal 
effect of Say on Pay on value, under our identification strategy. To compute abnormal returns we 
use two benchmarks: the market model and the four factor model (Carhart [1997]). 
 Columns 1–5 present nonparametric estimates, where the estimate of θ̂  is the difference 
in abnormal returns between proposals that pass and those that do not pass for increasingly small 
intervals around the voting threshold. Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. As 
expected, we find that there is no difference, on average, between proposals that pass and those 
that fail (a small point estimate of −0.00270 that is not statistically different from zero). This 
reflects that, for proposals that pass or fail by a large margin, the market already incorporates the 
expectation of vote outcomes in the prices. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to within 10 and 
5 percentage points of the threshold, respectively. As we narrow the margin of votes around the 
pass threshold, we begin to appreciate a small increase in the estimates though the standard 
errors are still large. For votes within 2.5 percentage points of the threshold (column 4), we 
observe an estimate of 1.27 percent abnormal return that is significant at the 5 percent confidence 
level. Finally, if we narrow the window to within 1.5 percentage points, we observe that the 
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estimate still follows an increasing pattern, reaching a statistically significant abnormal return of 
1.65 percent. 
 Column 6 shows the regression for Equation (2) for the entire sample, when we allow for 
a discontinuous jump at the majority threshold, but we control for two polynomials of order four 
in the vote share on each side of it. The results are consistent with the nonparametric ones: the 
abnormal return of firms that pass a Say on Pay proposal is 2.7 percent higher than for firms that 
do not pass such proposals. The point estimate in column 6 is larger and more precisely 
estimated than that in column 5, but the two estimates are not statistically different. 
 Panel B of Table 4 shows the same set of regressions using the Carhart four factor model 
as an alternative benchmark. We find a similar pattern of increasing estimates as we narrow the 
interval around the threshold. When fitting a polynomial on each side of the threshold, we obtain 
an estimate of the differential abnormal return of 2.23 percent, which is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. 
 Another way of visualizing these results is to plot the abnormal returns on the day of the 
meeting. Figures 3 and 4 show the impact of passing Say on Pay proposals on abnormal returns 
on the day of the vote. The daily abnormal returns were calculated from CRSP using the market 
model for Figure 3 and the three Fama-French factors and the fourth factor model from Carhart 
(1997) for Figure 4. The graphs plot the smoothed average daily abnormal return for the day of 
the meeting (t = 0) when the voting results are revealed.10 The X-axis reflects the margin of 
victory (the vote share minus the threshold for that vote). On the day of the vote, Say on Pay 
proposals that pass by a small margin have positive abnormal returns, and comparing those to 
proposals that fail by a small margin gives us the differential effect of passing such proposals on 
abnormal returns. For votes further away from the threshold, the abnormal return is 
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indistinguishable from zero. As Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) show, in an event study–
based regression discontinuity analysis, the price reaction as a function of the vote should 
decrease in the absolute distance to the threshold. This is because to the extent that the market 
has an unbiased prediction of the vote outcome prior to the vote, it should incorporate that 
information into prices. Therefore, for proposals that pass (or fail) by a large margin, the market 
should already have incorporated the value of the proposal prior to the vote, and we should have 
no abnormal returns on the day of the vote itself. It is only close to the majority threshold that the 
vote contains new information (whether the proposal effectively passes or fails) and resolves the 
uncertainty, triggering a market response. For proposals that narrowly pass, the adjustment is 
positive, and for proposals that narrowly fail, it is negative. In fact, how fast the abnormal return 
becomes zero as a function of the distance to the threshold is an indication of the precision with 
which the market was able to predict the vote. 
 In our data, proposals that pass with a very small margin of victory (up to 3 percent) have 
a positive abnormal return, and it decreases sharply with the distance to the threshold, denoting 
that the market is able to predict the vote outcome quite precisely. 
 Say on Pay proposals sponsored by shareholders have been at the center of controversy 
and have been closely followed by the media. Moreover, there are a variety of outlets such as 
news wires and real-time broadcasts that disclose the vote outcome on the same day as the 
annual meeting. However, even if a substantial part of the information about the vote is released 
on the day of the meeting, we need to explore any further gains (or potential reversals) beyond 
the date of the vote. Table 5 reports the regression for Equation (2), where the outcome variable 
yft is abnormal returns computed in different event windows around the day of the vote. We use 
the entire sample of data and a polynomial of order four in the vote share on each side of the 
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threshold. First, in column 1 the dependent variable is abnormal returns the day before the vote. 
The small and statistically insignificant coefficient indicates that the market cannot foresee the 
effect of Say on Pay the day before the vote for any of the benchmarks in Panel A and B. 
Second, in columns 3–5, we find that passing a Say on Pay proposal delivers abnormal returns 
beyond the day of the vote. Column 3 shows the impact of pass on a two-day window that 
includes the day of the vote and the following day. The coefficients are 3.6 percent for the 
market model and 3.7 percent for the Carhart four factor model, which are larger than the ones 
on the day of the vote and statistically significant at 5 percent level. Column 4 displays an even 
larger estimate for the one-week window: 3.8 percent for the market model and 5.1 percent for 
the Carhart four factor model. Finally, column 5 shows sustained estimates of 3.4 percent and 6.7 
percent, indicating that there is no reversal one month after the vote. Standard errors are much 
larger at longer windows, since there are many other events driving stock prices and creating 
noise; however, the fact that the estimated coefficients remain stable suggests that the Say on Pay 
effect is persistent. Overall, we find that the large positive market reaction to passing a Say on 
Pay proposal is sustained and even increases following the vote. 
 Overall, the results in this section show that the market reacts to the passing of Say on  
Pay proposals with market returns of up to 5 percent of firm value. Next, we explore the different 
channels that could be driving this market reaction. 
 
Implementation 
 In this section we document how much the implementation probability of a Say on Pay 
proposal changes at the vote majority threshold. There are three main purposes of this section. 
First, given that the vote outcome on shareholder proposals is typically nonbinding, it is 
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important to shed some light on the implementation of Say on Pay proposals and establish 
whether these votes do matter. Second, our identification strategy relies on a discontinuity of (a 
discrete change in) the implementation probability of a Say on Pay proposal at the majority 
threshold, so it is important to explicitly test for this assumption. Finally, in the previous section 
we established the market reaction of passing a proposal. However, this market reaction takes 
into account the fact that proposals will be implemented with a certain probability. In order to 
estimate the actual value of implementing a Say on Pay proposal, we need to rescale the market 
reaction dividing by the discrete jump in the probability of implementation of these proposals 
around the vote threshold between passing and not passing. 
 We have gathered complete implementation data for all voted proposals (note that since 
the Dodd-Frank legislation was passed in mid 2010 we omit late 2010 Say on Pay votes from 
this analysis since the law mandated it in all firms). Table 6 displays the effect of passing a 
proposal on the probability of implementation. Column 1 shows an estimate of 0.55 for the 
whole sample, that is, the probability that a proposal is implemented is 55 percentage points 
higher if it passes than if it does not. This is an average estimate for all vote outcomes, but we 
would like to estimate whether the probability of implementation changes just around the 
discontinuity. To do this we replicate the analysis in Table 4 with implementation as the 
dependent variable. From columns 2–5 we estimate the probability of implementation as a 
function of passing for increasingly small intervals around the voting threshold. Passing leads to 
a significant 48 percentage points higher probability of implementation for proposals within 10 
percent as well as within 5 percent of the majority threshold in columns 2 and 3. As we narrow 
the interval further to as much as 2.5 percent and 1.5 percent of the majority threshold (columns 
4 and 5), the differential probability of implementation is still 40 percent and statistically 
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significant. Finally, column 6 displays the full model given by Equation (2) and estimated using 
a polynomial in the vote share of order three on each side of the threshold. We obtain a very 
similar coefficient of 50 percent, significant at the 5 percent significance level. 
 With this estimate in hand of the probability of implementation in hand, we can provide a 
back-of-the envelope estimate of the value of a Say on Pay proposal. Using the abnormal returns 
from Table 5—2.7 percent on the day of the vote and 3.6 percent for the two-day window—
rescaling by a probability of implementation around the threshold of 50 percent, we estimate that 
the value of a Say on Pay proposal ranges from 5.4 percent to 7.2 percent. Of course, the true 
estimate will depend on what the expectation of the market was at the time of these votes. If the 
market expected a higher than 50 percent probability of implementation around the threshold, the 
estimate will be lower. If the expected change in the probability of implementation was 1 around 
the threshold, then the 2.7 percent abnormal reaction would be the actual value of the proposal as 
perceived by the market. 
 
4.3 The effect of Say on Pay on firm outcomes 
 We have established that the market reaction to passing a Say on Pay provision is 
positive. This increased market value may reflect the market perception of the cost saving and 
managerial efficiency gains that would be induced by the Say on Pay provision. As described in 
the second section of this paper, there are at least two channels that can deliver better 
performance for these Say on Pay firms. First, through a stricter alignment of pay with 
performance: these improved incentives would make the CEO more effective at generating 
higher profits. Second, through more efficient monitoring: the annual vote on Say on Pay may 
work as a vote of confidence on the CEO, providing enough pressure for delivering better 
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performance at the risk of being dismissed if the vote does not pass. In addition, the fact that 
there is a new established venue for expressing shareholder voice lowers the cost of coordinating 
and aggregating shareholders’ opinions regarding management and increases the incentives to 
monitoring. In this section we evaluate the real effects of Say on Pay proposals that may be 
induced by more intense and effective monitoring and better contractual incentives. 
 Tables 7 and 8 show the impact of passing a Say on Pay proposal on variables that 
capture firm profitability, long-term performance, and other real outcomes. Each cell 
corresponds to a different regression that measures the effect of passing a proposal at the 
discontinuity. We again use the identification strategy given by expression 2 with fourth order 
polynomials to each side of the majority threshold. Each column corresponds to a different 
dependent variable yft, and each panel to a different year-to-year effect. 
 We denote as year t the year in which the Say on Pay proposal is voted.11 Annual 
meetings are held between the two fiscal year-ends, which is when the variables used in this and 
the following section are recorded. Therefore, we define the time periods such that there were at 
least six months between the annual meeting when the vote is held and fiscal year end t. This 
means that the change between t and t − 1 includes some pretreatment months and the first few 
posttreatment months. The coefficients may capture early effects since most of our proposals are 
voted six months before the end of their fiscal year. The first panel measures changes in the 
variables from t − 1 to t. The second panel measures the change in variables from the end of the 
year of the vote t until the first full year after the Say on Pay vote (t + 1). Similarly, the bottom 
panel shows the change from t + 1 to t + 2. Variables are winsorized at a 5 percent level. 
 Table 7 reports the effect of passing a Say on Pay proposal on commonly used 
profitability measures. We define the dependent variables in this table (earnings per share, return 
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on equity, and return on assets) as changes within the firm, so that we estimate the differential 
effect of Say on Pay on profitability across treatment and control firms, net of preexisting 
differences in profitability (we identify the change within these firms as a result of Say on Pay). 
Since these variables have large outliers, and to make sure that these are not driving the results, 
we also define variables stating whether the change in profitability was positive or negative. 
 Overall, Table 7 shows that there are no effects of Say on Pay on profitability between t − 
1 and t, and sizable increases in profitability between t and t + 1 that are sustained through t + 2. 
(there are no significant reversals between t +1 and t + 2). Let us discuss in more detail the 
results between t and t + 1: Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show that one year after the vote, firms 
that pass Say on Pay have a 71 percent higher chance of increasing their earnings per share 
(positive earnings per share growth) than firms that fail to pass such provision. The estimated 
magnitude of the change (column 2) is non-negligible, exceeding $3 per share (which is around 
30 percent of the standard deviation of he change in EPS). Columns 2–6 show a similar pattern 
for the within-firm changes in return on equity and return on assets as a result of Say on Pay. 
Companies that pass Say on Pay have a 67 percent (column 3) and 71 percent (column 5) higher 
chance of reporting an increase in those variables. Column 5 (6) shows that the average increase 
in ROA (ROE) as a result of Say on Pay is 20 percent (5 percent). One interpretation of these 
results is that CEOs at Say on Pay firms have stronger incentives to increase firm performance 
under this new monitoring environment. 
 Next, we examine other broader measures of performance beyond short-term earnings. 
Again, we find that there are no significant changes between t − 1 and t, and that all the 
significant improvement occurs between t and t + 1 and is sustained thereafter. Column 1 of 
Table 8 shows that firms that pass Say on Pay report improvements in Tobin’s Q one year later. 
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The differential increase of 18 percent in Tobin’s Q is significant, and there is no reversal over 
the next year. Although the effect is substantial in levels, note that the variable itself is quite 
volatile, with a standard deviation of 78 percent. Improvements in Tobin’s Q may denote a more 
long term growth potential. How is this better performance attained? Column 2 shows that firms 
reduce costs as a result of Say on Pay as reflected in a 14 percent lower growth in overheads. We 
also see that they increase labor productivity, as reflected by the growth of sales per worker in 
column 3. Over the two years following the vote, firms that pass Say on Pay display a stronger 
productivity growth: 21 percent higher growth the first year and 24 percent higher growth the 
second year. Since these gains in productivity could come from delivering higher sales or, 
alternatively, from lowering employment growth. Columns 4 and 5 try to tell these channels 
apart. Column 6 shows that employment grows less in firms where Say on Pay passes one year 
after the vote: firms that pass Say on Pay lower their employment growth by 13 percent relative 
to those that do not pass Say on Pay. These results do not necessarily show that Say on Pay firms 
are cutting on employment, but rather a differential growth for Say on Pay firms relative to our 
control group. Two years after the vote, sales per worker continues to grow without further 
declines in employment. Column 5 shows that net income increases one year after the vote, and 
continues to increase, although not significantly two years later. This implies that while some of 
the increase in labor productivity was driven by a slower employment growth, it was also the 
result of continued sales growth. Finally, column 6 shows that firm assets did not respond in a 
significant way to Say on Pay. 
 In sum, firms that pass Say on Pay are delivering stronger performance. CEOs seem to be 
reacting to having a Say on Pay provision in place by providing shareholders with better 
earnings, as well as better Tobin’s Q, which may denote more long-term firm growth 
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opportunities. These performance results are accompanied by better productivity ratios, a 
reduction in overhead and a lower employment growth rate. Say on Pay provisions seem to be 
pushing CEOs to deliver stronger performance. CEOs cut costs and employment growth, but also 
increase their labor productivity. In the next section, we examine whether Say on Pay has an 
effect on the level of CEO pay and on the incentive structure. 
 
The effect of Say on Pay on CEO compensation 
 The main stated objective of Say on Pay proposals is to improve the alignment of CEO 
incentives with firm objectives. In general, one should see firms as diverse in their pay policies 
and in how they intend to improve them. However the declared emphasis of Say on Pay 
proposals on improving the relationship between pay and performance often translates into 
common proposed practices across these firms that can be seen in the pay proposals submitted to 
subsequent proxy materials. For example, new incentive schemes are intended to become more 
explicitly linked to quantitative performance measures that are easier to monitor. Similarly, pay 
components that are perceived as not directly linked to performance may be challenged. In this 
section we examine whether passing a Say on Pay proposal has an impact on the level and on the 
incentive structure of CEO pay. 
 In Table 9 we report the effect of Say on Pay at the discontinuity threshold on changes in 
different elements of CEO compensation. To deal with the fact that firms in our sample are 
heterogeneous in size and other characteristics, we measure all the monetary variables in growth 
rates, so that the effects we report are in one-percentage -point changes. Coefficients can then be 
interpreted as the percentage change between two periods induced by Say on Pay. Column 1 
reports the effect on total CEO compensation. We do not observe any significant change in the 
25 
 
growth rates of CEO compensation on the three years following the passing of a Say on Pay 
proposal. Column 2 reports the effect of Say on Pay on the probability of CEO turnover. If Say 
on Pay proposals induce better shareholder monitoring they may increase the probability of 
turnover. On the other hand, if CEOs are going to be watched more closely they could respond 
by performing better and, therefore, offsetting the increased monitoring and lowering the chances 
of being dismissed. We observe that the estimates for the effect on the probability of turnover are 
negative but not significant. In other words, CEOs in firms that pass Say on Pay are not more 
likely to leave than those in firms that do not pass Say on Pay (one cannot distinguish between 
voluntary quits and forced turnover with existing data). The probability of leaving (which 
includes dismissal) does not seem to be affected by Say on Pay proposals. Next we look into the 
changes on CEO compensation for firms that do not change their CEO. Column 3 reports a 
pattern similar to column 1, and the estimates are again not statistically different from zero. 
Taken together, the results in columns 1–3 show no differential effect between firms that pass 
Say on Pay proposals in terms of total CEO compensation or turnover. 
 We now turn to the different components of CEO pay. Column 4 reports the impact of 
passing Say on Pay on the change in salary: it decreases 4 percent one year after the Say on Pay 
proposal passes, and there is no reversal the following year. Given the fact that salary is a 
component of total compensation that is not directly linked to performance, this result is in line 
with the efforts to reduce the amount of compensation that is not sensitive to performance. 
Column 5 reports the effect on the growth of variable compensation (granting of stock, options, 
and bonus) and shows no particular differential pattern between firms that pass Say on Pay 
proposals and those that do not. Columns 6–8 look instead to the total portfolio of options and 
stock owned by the CEO. Columns 6 and 7 show no particular pattern in terms of the value of 
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the portfolio of stock (column 7) and options (column 6) held by the CEO. A decline in stock 
portfolio in the first panel (−0.509) is then followed by an increase in the second panel (0.468). 
Overall, there are no systematic and sustained changes in these variables as a result of Say on 
Pay. A similar pattern emerges in column 8, where we analyze changes in the overall delta of the 
portfolio of stock and options held.12 An insignificant drop in the first panel is followed by a 
significant increase of similar magnitude and a subsequent insignificant drop. Even though one 
of the coefficients is significant, there is no sustained identifiable change over the period 
analyzed. 
 Overall, the results in Table 9 show that the value of total CEO compensation or its 
separate components do not seem to be affected by Say on Pay in a systematic and sustained 
way. While some of the coefficients are large, they also have large standard errors, and most of 
the changes we see are reversed over time. 
 Since we found no systematic changes in the level of compensation, we also explicitly 
evaluate changes in the structure of pay. All dependent variables in Table 10 are calculated as the 
change in the share of each pay component in total compensation (as measured in Execucomp by 
the variable tdc1). Column 1 shows that the share of bonus has a slight increase for firms that 
pass Say on Pay in the first period (0.025), but this is followed by a decline of similar size 
(−0.032). Columns 2 and 3 display the changes in share of stock awards and option awards 
relative to total compensation. Again, there is no clear pattern on the granting of new options and 
shares. 
 One possible effect of the implementation of Say on Pay is that CEOs should try to 
reduce unpopular or excessively visible parts of CEO pay when they do not represent a large 
share of total compensation. Column 4 examines the effect of passing a Say on Pay proposal on 
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the share of pay that is deemed as private benefits or perks. The effects are small and 
insignificant, suggesting no effect of Say on Pay of the propensity to award perks to CEOs. 
Finally, column 5 focuses on the realizations of deferred compensation. It shows that the share of 
deferred compensation is not affected just after Say on Pay is approved; however, we find a 
sizable and significant increase two years later. CEOs may be less prone to cash in already 
accrued earnings after Say on Pay has been approved and decide to recover them later on. This is 
by definition a transitory effect and may be reflecting some degree of “window dressing” in CEO 
pay. 
 Overall, the results in this section show no systematic or sustained effects of Say on Pay 
on CEO compensation. Total pay does not change (although we find a small decline in salary), 
and the different components of compensation do not change in an identifiable and consistent 
manner. This can be explained by two mechanisms that are not mutually exclusive. First, as seen 
in the previous section, firm performance substantially increases after implementing Say on Pay. 
CEOs are performing better because of the increase in shareholder monitoring, and as a result, 
they may be able to justify levels of pay that do not differ substantially from their previous ones. 
Second, the adjustments of the pay packages may be heterogeneous across firms. Even if there is 
room for improvement in CEO pay packages, there may not be systematic deviations across 
firms. If each firm requires a different treatment, it would induce imprecise estimates of the 
effect of Say on Pay. In any case, we can rule out that Say on Pay systematically curbs 





 Say on Pay policy is an important governance change mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act 
that provides shareholders with a vote on executive pay. It is part of a general trend toward more 
CEO accountability and increased shareholder rights. Shareholders may use this new channel to 
voice their discontent regarding the link between pay and performance. This new policy is at the 
forefront of the debate on executive pay and its efficacy to deliver firm performance. 
 However, so far it has been difficult to assess its economic impact. Its mandatory 
imposition is not useful to identify its effects, as it is mandated together with other changes in 
governance practices at the firm level. Moreover, prior voluntary adoption of Say on Pay is an 
endogenous decision of the firm and is correlated with firm characteristics. To overcome these 
difficulties we use a regression discontinuity design on the outcomes of shareholders’ proposals 
to adopt a Say on Pay policy. This allows us to deal with the presence of prior expectations and 
estimate the causal effect of adopting the policy. We first show that adopting Say on Pay 
generates value for shareholders. Say on Pay proposals that pass yield, on average, an abnormal 
return of 2.7 percent relative to ones that fail on the day of the vote. This positive market reaction 
delivers a cumulative abnormal return of 5 percent one week after the vote. We can estimate the 
actual value of a Say on Pay proposal, which ranges from 5.4 percent to 7.2 percent of firm 
value. This is an economically sizable effect, which may arise through different potential 
channels. 
 The declared role of Say on Pay proposals is to improve CEO pay policies of firms. As 
such, these policies may affect firm value through better designed pay policies that motivate 
CEOs more efficiently. Moreover it may also help curb excessive pay, generating cost savings 
for the firm. Finally, the policy lowers the shareholder cost of expressing dissent, and therefore 
makes monitoring by shareholders more attractive and effective. We explore the relative 
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relevance of all of these mechanisms that could potentially be behind the shareholder reaction to 
the implementation of Say on Pay. 
 We find that firms that pass Say on Pay display stronger performance outcomes. CEOs 
seem to be reacting to having a provision in place by providing shareholders with better EPS 
marks, stronger profitability, and higher Tobin’s Q. We also find better productivity ratios and a 
lower employment growth rate. In short, Say on Pay provisions lead to stronger firm 
performance. 
 Regarding the effect of Say on Pay on the level of compensation, we find no effect on the 
total CEO compensation for firms that pass the policy. In terms of the composition of pay, we do 
observe a decrease in the fixed salary component and an increase in the variable component of 
pay. Despite finding small effects on CEO pay, we cannot rule out that part of the performance 
effects are due to adjustments in the pay structure that provide better incentives. It is important to 
note that the adjustments of the pay packages may be heterogeneous across firms. Even if there 
is room for improvement in CEO pay packages, there may not be systematic deviations across 
firms. If each firm requires a different treatment, this would induce small and imprecise 
estimates of the effect of Say on Pay. 
 Our results are consistent with viewing Say on Pay policy as resembling an annual 
confidence vote in which shareholders approve or reject the CEO’s performance relative to pay. 
This empowers shareholders, who have a new costless mechanism through which they can 
punish a CEO for poor performance. Overall our results suggest that CEOs are performing better 
due to the increase in shareholder monitoring and potentially due to better alignment of 
incentives. As a result, they may be able to justify total levels of pay that do not differ 
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Shareholder Say on Pay Proposals 
 
Panel A. Shareholder Proposal Summary Statistics 











































Total 258 55 21.37% 43.37 86 170 
       
       
Panel B. Type of Sponsor 
Type of sponsor Freq. Average vote St. dev. Min. Max.  
Fund 
Individual 















































NOTE: Panel A displays the frequency of Say on Pay voted proposals, the percentage passed, and the average 
support over time. Data are collected by RiskMetrics on all shareholders’ Say on Pay proposals from 2006 until 2010 
for all S&P 1500 companies, plus an additional 500 firms widely held. We have a sample of 258 voted proposals. For 






Descriptive Statistics and Sample Selection 
 
Say on Pay Target S&P 1500 
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 10th per. 90th per. Mean t-stat 
Market value ($mil) 257 57,354 27,389 76,953 2,574 154,375 6,783.303 10.32 
Tobin Q 249 1.62 1.34 0.78 0.96 2.74 1.7 −1.71 
Return on equity 257 0.06 0.14 1.14 −0.10 0.34 0.10 −0.55 
Return on assets 257 0.04 0.04 0.1 −0.01 0.13 0.11 −0.86 
Leverage (debt/assets) 256 0.271 0.246 0.167 0.079 0.549 0.205 6.1 
Payout (dividend/net income) 256 0.29 0.22 0.82 0 0.74 0.23 1.17 
Overheads  215 0.287 0.248 0.189 0.06 0.559 0.311 −1.85 
Sales per worker 257 742 422 945 218.4 1,511 501.27 3.9 
Log number employees 257 3.73 3.95 1.57 1.47 5.71 1.6 20.9 
CEO pay (thousands) 244 15,095 12,793 14,132 3,557 25,569 5,126.1 10.9 
CEO abnormal pay 245 −0.191 0.108 2.18 −0.705 0.703 −0.015 −1.26 
CEO stock awards Fair Value 236 4,870.1 3,788 5,548 0 12,22 1.6 8.9 
CEO option awards Fair Value 242 3,960.8 2,319 7,797 0 8,479 1,138.5 5.6 
Ownership by instit. shareholders 251 0.71 0.69 0.15 0.54 0.91 0.78 −6.1 
Ownership by top 5 shareholders 251 0.241 0.21 0.088 0.15 0.36 0.29 −9.1 
Number shareholders own > 5% 176 2.2 2 1.22 1 4 2.8 −5.9 
 
 
NOTE: Tobin’ Q is defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of assets 
(AT), and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC). Book-to-market is the ratio of book 
value of common equity (previous fiscal year) to market value of common equity (end of previous calendar year). 
CEO pay is defined as TDC1 in Execucomp. All monetary values are in 2010 US$. The number of observations may 
change due to missing values in some of the variables. SOURCE: Our sample consists of 258 voted proposals. All 
accounting variables are obtained from Compustat: Market Value (mkvalt_f), Leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/AT), 
Overheads (XSGA/XOPR), Payout (DVT/NI), Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on Assets (NI/AT), 





Pre-differences in Firm Characteristics as a Function of the Vote Outcome 
 
 Before meeting (t−1) Change, from (t−2) to (t−1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A.     
Abnormal return one day before 









Abnormal return one day before 
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Polynomial in the vote share no yes no yes 
NOTE: Panel A t refers to days, while for the rest, t refers to years. Each row corresponds to a different dependent 
variable and each entry comes from a separate regression. Each entry in the table reports the coefficient on whether a 
proposal passed. All columns control for year fixed effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
firm level. Car OLS is estimated using the market model, car FFM is estimated using a four factor model (Fama-
French three factor model plus momentum)  *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05level; and 




Abnormal Returns around the Majority Threshold 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 A. Market model 













Obs 255 170 89 43 28 255 
R-squared 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.119 0.198 0.042 
       
 B. m-French and Momentum 













Obs. 255 170 89 43 28 255 
R-squared 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.045 0.128 0.040 
 
NOTE: All columns control for year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. **significant at the 




Abnormal Returns beyond the Day of the Meeting 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 A. Market Model 











Obs. 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.097 0.042 0.073 0.052 0.080 
      
 B. Fama French & Momentum 











Obs. 255 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.061 0.040 0.085 0.063 0.036 
NOTE: All columns control for year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. *significant at the 0.10 level; 



































Observations 208 135 68 30 18 208 
R-squared 0.364 0.259 0.261 0.148 0.188 0.386 
NOTE: All columns control for year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. *significant at the 0.10 level; 

























Effect from t - 1 to t      












Obs. 257 257 257 257 257 257 
R-squared 0.109 0.151 0.095 0.066 0.153 0.117 
Effect from t to t + 1      












Obs. 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R- squared 0.197 0.198 0.149 0.146 0.183 0.216 
Effect from t + 1 to t + 2      












Obs. 115 115 115 115 115 115 
R- squared 0.168 0.119 0.140 0.185 0.114 0.119 
NOTE: The dependent variables obtained from Compustat are all defined as changes: Earnings per Share (EPS), 
Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on Assets (NI/AT). All dependent variables are winsorized at the 5th 
and 95th percentile.Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant 






























Effect from t - 1 to t      












Obs. 248 215 257 257 257 257 
R-squared 0.280 0.074 0.157 0.079 0.075 0.095 
Effect from t to t + 1      












Obs. 190 163 196 196 198 198 
R- squared 0.329 0.173 0.145 0.101 0.138 0.125 
Effect from t + 1 to t + 2      












Obs. 109 93 113 113 115 115 
R- squared 0.222 0.069 0.121 0.126 0.194 0.158 
NOTE: The dependent variables are obtained from Compustat are all defined in growth terms: Tobin's Q is defined 
as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of assets (AT), and balance sheet 
Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC), Overheads (XSGA/XOPR), Sales per Worker is defined as 
SALE/EMP, Employment (EMP), Net Income (EBITDA-INTPN), Total Assets (AT). All dependent variables are 
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. *significant at the 










Changes in the Level of Compensation 
 

















stock & option 
portfolio 
   Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO 

















Obs. 232 232 208 206 202 195 201 200 
R-sq. 0.067 0.036 0.112 0.072 0.107 0.395 0.124 0.350 

















Obs. 178 178 158 156 155 145 152 153 
R-sq. 0.056 0.052 0.081 0.090 0.079 0.316 0.200 0.382 

















Obs. 102 102 96 94 91 87 93 91 
R-sq. 0.147 0.024 0.165 0.044 0.243 0.335 0.150 0.256 
 
 




Changes in the Structure of Compensation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Share of bonus Share of stock 
awards 
Share of option 
awards 
Share of perks Share of deferred 
compensation 











Obs. 208 203 203 208 203 
R-squared 0.224 0.063 0.085 0.102 0.340 











Obs 158 158 158 158 158 
R- squared 0.139 0.126 0.119 0.030 0.166 











Obs. 96 96 96 96 96 
R- squared 0.091 0.101 0.033 0.074 0.153 
 
NOTE: All dependent variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses are 








                                                 
NOTES 
1 In the proxy materials mailed to shareholders, management states a recommendation on all proposals included by 
shareholders to be voted on; in all but two shareholder Say on Pay proposals in our sample, the management 
recommendation was to vote against the proposal. 
2 Furthermore, the existing evidence on Say on Pay is silent on the performance effects of the policy. Balachandran, 
Ferri and Maber (2008) and Ferri and Maber (2013) provide some evidence for the UK, where Say on Pay 
regulation was introduced in 2002, suggesting that Say on Pay increases the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor 
performance, that is, it may curb “pay for failure.” For the United States, Cai and Walkling (2011) do an event study 
using the Say on Pay bill that passed in the House in 2007 and find that returns were higher on that date in firms 
with inefficient compensation contracts (high abnormal CEO pay and low pay-for-performance sensitivity). 
3 Note that we study the votes to adopt the policy. If the policy is adopted then shareholders vote on the relationship 
between CEO pay and performance in subsequent meetings. 
4 The main difference between firms in the sample (those targeted by a Say on Pay vote between 2006 and 2010) 
and the rest of the S&P 1500 firms is size.  Firms in the sample are clearly larger (in sales and employment), but 
there is no difference in operating ratios or other variables once size is controlled for. Cai and Walkling (2011) find 
similar differences. 
5 The Dodd-Frank Act required an additional vote regarding the frequency of the compensation approval vote: to 
occur every one, two, or three years. 
6 The estimation period starts two months prior to the event date; the length of the estimation period is 200 trading 
days, and we require at least 15 days with available returns. 
7 We also did not find differences when we construct a more comprehensive model of abnormal pay that controls for 
size and profitability, as well as year and sector dummies. 
43 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 In none of our observations did the top five shareholders accumulate enough votes to constitute a majority of votes 
cast. 
9 A formal continuity test (McCrary 2008) rejects the discontinuity of the distribution. See Figure 2. 
10 The nonparametric regression uses a tri-cube weight and a bandwidth of half of the sample to each side of the 
discontinuity. 
11 This is an intuitive way to set the cut from one year to another, though our results are robust to different cuts.  
Most of the proxy season takes place between April and June—88 percent of the proposals in our sample take place 
before June. 
12 The total delta of the portfolio is calculated following Core and Guay (1999). 
